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Killer Robots:  
Regulate, don’t ban
Executive summary
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (‘LAWS’) are 
here. Technological development will see them become 
widespread in the near future. This is in a matter of years 
rather than decades. When the UN Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons meets on 10-14th November 
2014, well-considered guidance for a decision on the 
general policy direction for LAWS is clearly needed. While 
there is widespread opposition to LAWS—or ‘killer robots’, 
as they are popularly called—and a growing campaign 
advocates banning them outright, we argue the opposite. 
LAWS may very well reduce suffering and death in war. 
Rather than banning them, they should be regulated, to 
ensure both compliance with international humanitarian 
law, and that this positive outcome occurs. This policy 
memo sets out the basic structure and content of the 
regulation required.
The technology is in use and developing fast
The characteristic forerunners of this technology are 
drones armed with missiles. At present, a pilot flies the 
system remotely; intelligence analysts assess the target 
information provided; and military commanders supported 
by legal advice make the decision to attack. Current 
R&D programmes aim to automate these processes for 
systems deployable on land, at sea, underwater and in the 
air. In time, a system’s movement, target acquisition, and 
ultimately decision to kill, could be made autonomously. 
(For overview and research plans until 2038, see US 
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Policy recommendations
 z Expand remit of war crimes legal regimes—both 
international and national—to include illegitimate 
distribution and use of LAWS
 z Establish national and international technical 
standards and licensing bodies for LAWS
 z Enshrine compliance with International 
Humanitarian Law’s principles of distinction and 
proportionality, in the technical standards and 
licensing bodies
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Department of Defense 2013; also Singer 2009 and 
Birmingham Policy Commission 2014.)
Some LAWS are already in use. The ‘Phalanx’ Close-In 
Weapons System used to defend ships can autonomously 
identify and attack oncoming missiles, rockets, artillery 
fire, aircraft and surface vessels according to criteria set 
by the human operator. Similar systems exist for tanks. 
These systems could not perform their defensive function 
if they needed human authorisation to engage each 
target. 
Fundamental principles to clear the muddy moral waters
The basic case in favour of LAWS is simple: We can 
spend treasure, to save blood. Fewer lives lost at war is a 
valuable thing. So is better digital documentation of war 
and thus prosecution of war crimes. Just as it is culpable 
negligence to send in the infantry without body armour 
and helmets, so—other things equal—it is also negligent 
to fail to develop LAWS.
The most significant moral question arises about the 
attribution of responsibility for LAWS’ killings. When 
things go wrong 
and civilians are 
killed, who is to 
blame? We propose 
that responsibility 
for the effects 
of LAWS should 
be attributed in 
exactly the same 
way as any other 
technological system. Consider medicines. These have 
generally predictable results but with a risk of negative 
side-effects. So drugs are tested during development and 
only then licensed for prescription. When prescribed in 
accordance with the guidelines, neither the doctors nor 
drug companies are responsible for side-effects (though 
reliability for defective manufacturing, defective design or 
failing to warn still holds). Instead, the body that licenses 
the medicine, such as the FDA or NICE, is responsible for 
ensuring overall beneficial outcomes.
Apply this to LAWS. The same division of responsibility 
occurs between engineers, military users, and the 
government. These implications follow: 
 z There is pressing need for a regulatory regime 
to govern LAWS, both legally and in terms of 
technical standards. This is a moral responsibility of 
governments and international organisations. 
 z The deployment of LAWS is acceptable only if 
that system reduces risk to both combatants 
and civilians. Risk reduction is the overall beneficial 
outcome that justifies their development. It is not 
permissible to reduce risk to soldiers by increasing that 
to civilians. 
 z LAWS are weapons of war, and so they must 
comply with the regulations of International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) in the Geneva 
Conventions. In particular, they must comply with 
the principle of distinction, viz. have the ability to 
discriminate combatants from non-combatants. They 
must also comply with the principle of proportionality, 
viz. that damage to civilians is proportional to the 
military aim. 
Current legal regimes can provide the appropriate regulatory mechanisms
Regulating LAWS will be challenging in practice. This 
is because their ability to distinguish legitimate from 
illegitimate targets, and attack in a proportionate manner, 
is not in the direct self-interest of a particular nation 
at war. For a particular nation, deployment of LAWS 
reduces the risk to their own soldiers, and there is a 
temptation to do so by ‘off-loading’ risk onto foreign 
civilian populations. So long as legitimate targets are 
attacked, tactical military effect is still achieved regardless 
of how many non-combatants LAWS also attack. ‘Shoot 
everything that moves’ is the logical extreme, but less 
crazy attack parameters still off-load risks onto civilians. 
As such, LAWS which reduce risk to civilians are an 
international public good: everyone has reason to prefer 
that everyone uses only technologies which comply with 
this requirement, but nations have no individual interest in 
ensuring their own compliance.
We propose that the same legal regime which enforces 
accountability for individual war criminals be applied also 
to LAWS. War crimes have the same international public 
good incentive structure. Moreover, victimisation of non-
combatants for the sake of reducing risk to one’s own 
soldiers is a war crime. Internationally agreed standards 
on conduct in war, notably the Geneva Conventions, 
are incorporated into domestic law. Domestic judicial 
institutions are then primarily responsible for the 
enforcement of these standards. Where states are unable 
or unwilling to enforce these standards, an international 
body (the International Criminal Court) has ‘back-up’ 
jurisdiction. 
“There is a strong 
moral imperative for 
ensuring that regulation 
precedes tragedy, rather 
than coming only as a 
response.”
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Legal and technical regulation
International National
Legal International Humanitarian Law Criminal Law
Technical Technical standards for performance Control regimes for techical standards; national-specific 
standards
Five policy recommendations for regulating LAWS
1. Establish an international technical standards agency 
for LAWS  
LAWS’s reliability in meeting principles of distinction and 
proportionality is in part a moral and political judgment. 
It is then expressed in technical specifications. An 
international standards agency is required to establish 
and maintain those specifications as the technology 
evolves. In particular, it must ensure a high degree of 
success for LAWS in distinguishing legitimate from 
illegitimate targets, and attacking the former only when 
it is proportional and necessary to do so. 
2. Establish national technical standards and licensing 
bodies for LAWS 
National or supranational regulatory bodies are 
required to then incorporate, and/or establish domestic 
standards of technical specifications, issue licenses and 
control manufacturers.  
The institutional burden here is less than it seems. 
This is likely best fulfilled as an additional function of 
those bodies that will have to be established for civil 
autonomous robotics anyway—e.g. autonomous cars, 
search & rescue robots, autonomous mini-copter 
postal services, etc. (see Palmerini et al. 2014 for the 
case of the EU). The same point applies to the wider 
need for an international standards agency on robotic 
technology.
3. Extend war crimes legal instruments to the illegitimate 
use of LAWS 
Alongside national and international standards bodies, 
a legal regime is required to enforce compliance. We 
propose that the remit of existing legal instruments 
for war crimes be extended to include the illegitimate 
use of LAWS. Illegitimate use includes: the distribution 
of non-standards-compliant LAWS; the use of non-
standards-compliant LAWS; and the intentionally 
malign or culpably negligent use of LAWS. 
4. Permit the distribution of LAWS only when there is 
better-than-human performance 
Civilians must be exposed to less risk when LAWS are 
pursuing military targets than when humans are doing 
the same. Unless this is so, it is an unfair redistribution 
of risk, exploiting civilians’ vulnerability. So LAWS must 
achieve rates of compliance with the IHL principles of 
distinction and proportionality that are better than 
humans’ in order to be deployed.  
Contrary to popular belief, it is wholly plausible that 
some LAWS will reach this standard in the near future. 
For example, tanks are useful solely for military 
purposes, and they give distinctive and recognisable 
heat signatures that can be used for targeting. 
LAWS are different from other weapons, in that war 
crimes can not only be committed by users, but also by 
manufacturers. A manufacturer who distributes a system 
that does not meet the standards of distinction and 
proportionality is also guilty of a war crime. Therefore, 
technical standards of performance must be established 
and enforced through public licenses. In this regard, the 
instructive parallels are the national and international 
bodies that govern other important technologies, such as 
the International Civil Aviation Organisation.
US Navy: A common unmanned surface vehicle patrols for intruders during 
Trident Warrior 2011
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Timeframe for implementation
There is general agreement, on both sides of the debate, that the 10-14th November 2014 meeting of the UN 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons is propitious for a decision on the general policy direction for LAWS. 
For the ‘ban now’ camp, it is better to stop up the bottle than try and put the genie back in once escaped. For the 
‘regulate’ camp—where we sit—there is a strong moral imperative for ensuring that regulation precedes tragedy, 
rather than coming only as a response (cf. Heyns 2013). The period till 2020 constitutes a realistic and necessary 
timeframe to put the basic regulatory structures in place. 
The arguments stated here are developed in detail in Autonomous Killer Robots Are Probably Good News, Müller and 
Simpson (http://bit.ly/1zzTrra), and Just War and Robots’ Killings, Simpson and Müller (http://bit.ly/111vV8v).
References
Birmingham Policy Commission (2014), ‘The security impact of drones: Challenges and opportunities for the UK’,  (October 
2014). http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/impact/policy-commissions/remote-warfare/index.aspx. 
Heyns, Christof (2013), ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions’, UN General 
Assembly, Human Rights Council, 23 (3), A/HRC/23/47. 
Müller, Vincent C. and Simpson, Thomas W (forthcoming), ‘Autonomous Killer Robots Are Probably Good News’, in Ezio Di Nucci 
and Filippo Santoni de Sio (eds.), Drones and responsibility: Legal, philosophical and socio-technical perspectives on the use of 
remotely controlled weapons (London: Ashgate). 
Palmerini, Erica, et al. (2014), Guidelines on Regulating Robotics, 22/09/2014 (http://www.robolaw.eu/) 215pp.
Simpson, Thomas W and Müller, Vincent C. (Draft 2014), ‘Just war and robots’ killings’. 
Singer, Peter (2009), Wired for war: The robotics revolution and conflict in the 21st Century (New York: Penguin). 
US Department of Defense (2013), ‘Unmanned Systems Integrated Road Map FY2013-2038’. http://www.defense.gov/pubs/
DOD-USRM-2013.pdf.
Authors (in alphabetical order)
Vincent C Müller is Professor of Philosophy at ACT/Anatolia College in Thessaloniki. He is a former conscientious 
objector (to German National Service). His website is at www.sophia.de and he can be contacted at vmueller@act.edu
Thomas W Simpson is the Associate Professor of Philosophy and Public Policy at the Blavatnik School of 
Government, University of Oxford, and a Senior Research Fellow at Wadham College. He formerly served as an 
officer with the UK Royal Marines Commandos, deploying to Iraq, Afghanistan and Northern Ireland. He can be 
contacted at thomas.simpson@bsg.ox.ac.uk. 
The Blavatnik School of Government at the University of Oxford exists to inspire and support 
better public policy and government around the world. 
www.bsg.ox.ac.uk | enquiries@bsg.ox.ac.uk
Images:
BAE Systems Taranis drone (Copyright © 2014 BAE Systems. All rights reserved)
US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Scott Youngblood
5. Permit the use of LAWS for killing only when there is 
compelling military reason 
Remotely-operated weapons systems achieve the 
same reduction of risk to a military’s soldiers as 
automated systems do. By definition, remotely-
operated systems comply with IHL to the same degree 
as humans. So the uncertainty about non-compliance 
with IHL, that goes with LAWS, should be permitted 
only when there is compelling military reason to 
automate. 
 
There are three such reasons: 1) When the speed of 
cognition achieved by a computer exceeds that of a 
human, and the combat situation requires it, automated 
systems enjoy a tactical advantage over manned- 
or remotely-operated adversaries; 2) When the 
number of automated systems is so high that human 
operators cannot feasibly control them, as in ‘swarm’ 
concepts; and 3) When the environment is such that 
communication links between system and operator 
cannot be guaranteed, automation makes military 
operations possible. 
